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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Irwin Halper appeals the District Court's order affirming 
the Bankruptcy Court's order determining that a Guaranty 
in favor of Irwin was void as against public policy because 
it was part of an illegal stock redemption and a fraudulent 
conveyance under New Jersey and federal bankruptcy law. 
We conclude that the District Court erroneously applied 
New Jersey's contract principles in the course offinding 
this to be a stock redemption. We further conclude that the 
Bankruptcy Court lacked core proceeding jurisdiction to 
enter a final judgment regarding the Guaranty's 
enforceability. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Irwin Halper and his three cousins, Barry, Jeffrey and 
Robert, were the sole owners of Halper Bros. Inc. ("HBI"), a 
New Jersey corporation that distributed wholesale paper 
and janitorial supplies. Each cousin owned 25% of HBI's 
stock and participated in HBI's management and operation. 
In the spring of 1990, each shareholder contributed 
$300,000 to HBI's Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
("ESOP"). In 1989 and into 1990, HBI began to suffer 
financial difficulty. Barry, interested in restructuring to 
continue running HBI on his own, began negotiating a 
buyout of his cousins' stock. On February 13, 1991, the 
cousins entered an agreement ("February Agreement") 
whereby Barry agreed to purchase personally each of his 
cousins' 25% HBI stock holdings for $300,000 apiece with 
$25,000 down. Barry paid Irwin's $25,000 down payment 
 
                                2 
  
by personal check. The February Agreement was not 
consummated, however, because Citibank, a creditor of 
HBI's, refused to approve the buyout. 
 
Further buyout negotiations ensued in which Barry 
suggested that the transaction be structured as a stock 
redemption by HBI. The three selling cousins, however, 
rejected the redemption format because they were 
concerned that HBI's insolvency would render it an illegal 
redemption and a fraudulent transfer under New Jersey 
law. Instead, Irwin and the other selling cousins insisted 
that the buyout take place either (i) through a personal 
purchase by Barry, or (ii) by an entity formed by Barry.1 
Barry's accountants and lawyers, on the other hand, 
advised Barry that if the transaction included an 
employment agreement for each of the cousins giving up 
his stock, the compensation provided for his services would 
provide HBI with a significant tax deduction. This raised 
further concerns for the selling cousins who feared that 
HBI's financial condition might prevent it from honoring an 
employment arrangement. 
 
The parties reached a compromise, which they 
memorialized in four agreements on September 5, 1991 
("September Transaction"): (i) Letter Agreement, (ii) 
Employment Agreement, (iii) Guaranty and Indemnity 
Agreement, and (iv) Voting Trust Agreement. (Pa. 527-89). 
There were three parties to each set of documents: (i) the 
selling cousin involved, (ii) Barry Halper, and (iii) HBI 
represented by Barry Halper as President. This appeal 
involves only the rights of the parties to the agreements 
executed by Irwin Halper. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. An August 2, 1991 letter from the law firm representing Irwin, Robert 
and Jeffrey illustrates their position: 
 
       The possibility of insolvency involved litigation as to the 
redemption 
       of our client's stock by [HBI] strongly argues in favor of a direct 
       purchase by Barry or an entity created and funded by him for such 
       purpose. . . . [A]ll [HBI] stock owned by [Irwin, Jeffrey and 
Robert] 
       must be purchased and all of the purchase price paid either by 
       Barry Halper or an entity controlled by him, and not[HBI]. 
 
(Pa. 524). 
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The Agreements are integrated. This is evident from (i) 
the Letter Agreement's summary of the transaction and 
description of the other three documents' significance, and 
(ii) the other three documents' numerous cross references 
to one another. The Employment Agreement provides, inter 
alia, that HBI would pay Irwin a $300,000 signing bonus 
less the $25,000 he received in connection with the failed 
February Agreement, with the remaining $275,000 to be 
paid in 12 equal monthly installments commencing 
January 31, 1992.2 The Guaranty and Indemnity 
Agreement ("Guaranty") provided that Barry personally 
guaranteed HBI's payment of Irwin's signing bonus; Barry 
and Irwin signed it in their individual capacities. The 
Guaranty accommodated the selling cousins' concerns that 
HBI's financial troubles might prevent it from honoring its 
signing bonus obligation. The Voting Trust Agreement 
provided that Irwin's HBI shares would be immediately 
transferred to a voting trust with Barry as trustee, giving 
Barry the irrevocable right to vote Irwin's shares. Finally, 
Paragraph 9 of the Letter Agreement provided that Irwin 
granted a three year irrevocable option to purchase his HBI 
stock for $1.00 consideration to (i) Barry personally, (ii) an 
entity created by Barry for the purchase, or (iii) HBI. 
 
The parties agree that the September Transaction's 
objective was to vest Barry with total ownership and control 
of HBI. Indeed, the September Transaction gave Barry 
absolute control over HBI on September 5, 1991, as trustee 
under the Voting Trust. The only thing left to complete the 
buyout was for Barry to decide how to exercise the option 
to transfer beneficial ownership of the shares. 
 
That decision was made in January, 1992, when Barry's 
attorney, Mr. Gladstone, advised him that he should 
exercise the Paragraph 9 option. On January 15, 1992, 
Gladstone's firm drafted a letter which Barry signed 
("Purchase Letter") stating: 
 
        Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Letter Agreement you 
       are hereby notified that I elect to exercise my option to 
       acquire all of the shares of stock in [HBI] which are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Employment Agreement also provided that Irwin would continue 
as a HBI salesman and granted him a car, insurance and other benefits. 
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       held by the Voting Trustee pursuant to the Voting 
       Trust Agreement. 
 
        I hereby request that the Voting Trustee take 
       immediate steps in order to effectuate the transfer of 
       said shares of stock to me. 
 
(Pa. 526). Barry signed the letter in his personal capacity, 
not as HBI's President. 
 
On January 17, 1992, two days after Barry exercised the 
option, HBI's creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition. Not surprisingly, HBI did not honor its signing 
bonus obligations under the Employment Agreement, and 
Irwin resorted to his rights under the Guaranty. After 
several unsuccessful demands for payment from Barry, 
Irwin instituted an action in New Jersey Superior Court to 
enforce the Guaranty on January 24, 1993. Two days 
earlier, on January 22, 1993, Barry had filed a complaint 
in Bankruptcy Court. Barry's complaint provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
       Barry seeks a declaration from this Court (1) that the 
       underlying obligation from HBI to Irwin is void as a 
       redemption by a corporation while insolvent, and a 
       further declaration that Barry's personal guaranty does 
       not extend to this void agreement and (2) that the 
       obligation arising out of the "signing bonus" is void as 
       a fraudulent transfer. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       WHEREFORE, plaintiff Barry Halper demands 
       judgment against Irwin Halper as follows: 
 
        (a) declaring that the signing bonus to be paid by 
       [HBI] to Irwin Halper is void as (1) a redemption made 
       by an insolvent corporation; and (2) that the obligation 
       is a fraudulent transfer under Bankruptcy Code 
       S 548(a)(2) 
 
        (b) declaring that Barry Halper's obligation to Irwin 
       Halper does not include the void redemption or 
       fraudulent transfer by [HBI] . . . . 
 
(Pa. 1243-44). Alternatively, Barry sought a declaratory 
judgment that (i) if the signing bonus is a valid obligation 
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of HBI, then HBI's obligation thereunder is limited to 
$75,000 under Bankruptcy Code S 502(b)(7); and (ii) that 
Barry's liability under the Guaranty should similarly be 
limited to $75,000.3 
 
Barry successfully removed Irwin's state court action to 
the Bankruptcy Court, and the actions were consolidated 
for trial over Irwin's objection that the Bankruptcy Court 
lacked jurisdiction over his suit. Four years later, on 
February 21, 1997, the Bankruptcy Court rendered 
judgment in favor of Barry declaring the Guaranty 
unenforceable as against New Jersey's public policy 
because it was part of an illegal stock redemption under 
New Jersey law and constituted a fraudulent transfer under 
New Jersey and federal bankruptcy law. Irwin appealed the 
Bankruptcy Court's order to the District Court, which 
affirmed.4 Irwin now appeals the District Court's order 
affirming the Bankruptcy Court's judgment. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the decision of a District 
Court sitting as an appellate court in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. See In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 
552, 559 (3d Cir. 1994). In turn, this court reviews the 
Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact under the clearly 
erroneous standard and conclusions of law under a de novo 
standard. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 
1222-23 (3d Cir. 1989). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Bankruptcy Code S 502(b)(7) limits employee claims for damages 
arising from the debtor's termination of an employment contract. 
 
4. The Bankruptcy Court's judgment order grants Barry's request for 
declaratory judgment stating: 
 
       1) The transaction memorialized in the series of agreements entered 
       into by and between the parties on September 5, 1991 constitutes 
       an (i) illegal stock redemption by the Debtor while insolvent and 
(ii) 
       a fraudulent conveyance pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 548 and N.J.S.A. 
       25:2-20, et seq.; and 
 
       2) The Guaranty is void and unenforceable; and 
 
       3) Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Barry Halper, and against 
       Irwin Halper, in the above captioned matters. 
 
(Pa. 35). The District Court's order simply states that it affirms. (Pa. 
21). 
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II. JURISDICTION 
 
The Bankruptcy and District Courts determined that the 
Bankruptcy Court had core proceeding jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 157(b) giving it the power to issue final 
judgment on all claims in this action. Irwin challenges this 
determination, claiming that the Bankruptcy Court entirely 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claims between Barry 
and himself. He objects on the grounds that HBI was not a 
party and that, in his view, the adjudication of their 
disputes could not affect HBI's creditors. He concludes that 
this entire proceeding is therefore not "related to" the 
bankruptcy as required to support non-core jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 157(c). 
 
We conclude that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction 
over all claims asserted in the Bankruptcy Court, but that 
the character of its jurisdiction varied among the claims. 
We find that the Bankruptcy Court had only non-core 
jurisdiction over the Guaranty claims and that, as a result, 
it lacked the power to issue a final judgment on that 
matter. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's 
judgment affirming the exercise of core jurisdiction over the 
Guaranty claims. 
 
Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction has been the subject of 
heated controversy in recent decades. See In re Guild & 
Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171, 1176-79 (3d Cir. 
1996)(discussing Bankruptcy Courts' history); Phar-Mor, 
Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 
1994)(same). In 1978, Congress attempted to centralize 
bankruptcy jurisdiction by granting District and 
Bankruptcy Courts expanded jurisdiction over cases arising 
under title 11. In re Guild, 72 F.3d at 1177 (quoting 
Thomas S. Marion, Core Proceedings and "New" Bankruptcy 
Jurisdiction, 35 DePaul L. Rev. 675, 678 (1986)). Under this 
scheme, Article I bankruptcy judges possessed full power to 
adjudicate not only cases arising directly under title 11, but 
also a wide range of other claims merely "related to" the 
title 11 proceedings. Id. In Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), however, the 
Supreme Court held the 1978 jurisdictional reform 
unconstitutional because its grant of judicial power to 
Article I Bankruptcy Courts violated the separation of 
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powers doctrine by undermining Article III's establishment 
of an independent judiciary. Id. at 84-85. 
 
In Marathon, the debtor had filed a chapter 11 petition in 
Bankruptcy Court and subsequently initiated an adversary 
proceeding against Marathon for various pre-petition 
violations of state law including breach of contract. The 
parties to the adversary proceeding were not diverse, and 
the dispute involved pure questions of state law presenting 
no federal question. The only basis for federal jurisdiction 
was the fact that one party was a chapter 11 debtor in 
bankruptcy. Id. at 90. Distinguishing "the restructuring of 
debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal 
bankruptcy power . . . from the adjudication of state- 
created private rights, such as the right to recover damages 
that is at issue in this case," Justice Brennan concluded 
that the statute violated Article III because it 
unconstitutionally vested "all `essential attributes' of the 
judicial power of the United States in the `adjunct' [Article 
I] bankruptcy courts." Id. at 71, 84-85 (emphasis added). 
 
In 1984, Congress responded to Marathon and 
established the current bankruptcy jurisdiction regime 
codified at 28 U.S.C. S 1334 and 28 U.S.C. S 157. Section 
1334 vests broad primary jurisdiction over bankruptcy 
proceedings in the District Courts.5 District Courts may, 
however, refer bankruptcy matters falling within their 
jurisdiction to the Bankruptcy Courts under 28 U.S.C. 
S 157(a). District Courts have exercised this power by 
"routinely refer[ing] most bankruptcy cases to the 
bankruptcy court[s]." In re Guild, 72 F.3d at 1175. 
 
Upon referral, "[s]ection 157 provides the bankruptcy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 1334 of title 28 states in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the 
district 
       court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases 
under 
       title 11. 
 
       (b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive 
       jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, 
the 
       district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction 
of all 
       civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related 
to 
       cases under title 11. 
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court with two levels of judicial power, depending upon the 
type of proceeding before it." In re Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d 
261, 266 (3d Cir. 1991). First, in "core" proceedings, the 
Bankruptcy Court assumes the role of a court of first 
instance with comprehensive power to hear, decide and 
enter final orders and judgments. See 28 U.S.C. S 157(b)(1). 
Appellate review of the Bankruptcy Court's judgment is 
available initially in the District Court and then in the 
Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. S 158. Second, in "non- 
core" proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court's adjudicatory 
power is limited to hearing the dispute and submitting 
"proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law to the 
district court." Id. S 157(c)(1). 6 The District Court, after 
considering the Bankruptcy Court's proposed findings and 
conducting a de novo review of any matter objected to 
therein, enters final orders and judgments in "non-core" 
proceedings. See id. at S 157(c)(1). Section 157's distinction 
between "core" and "non-core" proceedings mirrors Justice 
Brennan's distinction in Marathon, and the jurisdictional 
variance between the two types of proceedings was intended 
"to satisfy the concerns of Marathon." Phar-Mor, 22 F.3d at 
1234; see In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 
1987)(discussing congruence between Marathon and S 157's 
jurisdictional regime). 
 
Thus, a proceeding's core or non-core nature is crucial in 
bankruptcy cases because it defines both the extent of the 
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, and the standard by which 
the District Court reviews its factual findings. To determine 
whether a proceeding is a "core" proceeding, courts of this 
Circuit must consult two sources. First, a court must 
consult S 157(b). Although S 157(b) does not precisely define 
"core" proceedings, it nonetheless provides an illustrative 
list of proceedings that may be considered "core." See id. 
S 157(b)(2)(A)-(O). Second, the court must apply this court's 
test for a "core" proceeding. Under that test, " `a proceeding 
is core [1] if it invokes a substantive right provided by title 
11 or [2] if it is a proceeding, that by its nature, could arise 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court may, upon consent of the parties, expand the 
Bankruptcy Court's power to adjudicate "non-core" proceedings to 
include the power to issue final orders and judgments. 28 U.S.C. 
S 157(c)(2). 
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only in the context of a bankruptcy case.' " In re Guild & 
Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 
1996)(quoting Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d at 267); see In re: 
Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 1997); cf. 
Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 1990). This 
Court and other courts of appeals have relied on this test 
to ensure that S 157(b) "core" proceeding jurisdiction is 
exercised in a manner consistent with Marathon.7 
 
Non-core proceedings include the broader universe of all 
proceedings that are not core proceedings but are 
nevertheless "related to" a bankruptcy case. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 157(c)(1). "[T]he test for determining whether a civil 
proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome 
of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the 
estate being administered in bankruptcy." Pacor v. Higgins, 
743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis omitted); see In 
re Guild, 72 F.3d at 1180-81.8 "[T]he proceeding need not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See, e.g., Sanders Confectionary Prod's v. Heller Fin., 973 F.2d 474, 
483 (6th Cir. 1992)("A core proceeding either invokes a substantive right 
created by federal bankruptcy law or [is] one which could not exist 
outside of the bankruptcy."); In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 
1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997)("Core proceedings are actions by or against 
the debtor that arise under the Bankruptcy Code in the strong sense 
that the Code itself is the source of the claimant's right or remedy . . . 
"); 
Specialty Mills, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 51 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 
1995)("Core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. S 157 are those which arise 
only in bankruptcy or involve a right created by federal bankruptcy 
law."); Security Farms v. International Brh'd of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Wharehouseman & Helpers, 124 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Actions 
that do not depend on bankruptcy laws for their existence and that 
could proceed in another court are considered `non-core.' "); In re 
Gardner, 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990)("Actions which do not 
depend on the bankruptcy laws for their existence and which could 
proceed in another court are not core proceedings."). 
 
8. The Supreme Court has effectively overruled Pacor with respect to its 
holding that the prohibition against review of a remand order in 28 
U.S.C. S1447(d) does not apply to a bankruptcy case. See Things 
Remembered Inc. v. Petrarca, 116 S.Ct. 494 (1995). The Supreme Court's 
ruling, however, did not disturb Pacor's holding regarding what 
constitutes a non-core proceeding. See Donaldson v. Bernstein, 104 F.3d 
547, 554 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997). In fact, the Pacor non-core test has been 
widely followed by our sister circuits. 
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necessarily be against the debtor or against the debtor's 
property." In re Guild, 72 F.3d at 1180-81. " `A key word in 
[this test] is conceivable. Certainty, or even likelihood, is 
not a requirement. Bankruptcy jurisdiction will exist so 
long as it is possible that a proceeding may impact on the 
debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action or 
the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.' " 
Id. at 1181 (quoting In re Marcus Hook, 943 F.2d at 264) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 
Barry and Irwin's consolidated action presented the 
Bankruptcy Court with five claims: 
 
       1. Barry sought a declaratory judgment that HBI's 
       signing bonus is unenforceable because it was (a) part 
       of an illegal stock redemption under N.J.S.A. 14A:7- 
       14.1; (b) a fraudulent transfer under N.J.S.A. 25:2-20 
       et seq.; and (c) a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. 
       S 548. 
 
       2. Barry sought a declaratory judgment that his 
       personal Guaranty of the signing bonus is 
       unenforceable because HBI's underlying obligation was 
       void. 
 
       3. Conversely, Irwin sought a coercive judgment 
       enforcing Barry's personal Guaranty. 
 
       4. Barry sought a declaratory judgment that, if th e 
       signing bonus is enforceable, then HBI's obligation is 
       limited to $75,000 under 11 U.S.C. S 502(b)(7). 
 
       5. Barry sought a declaratory judgment that his 
       liability under the Guaranty should be coextensive with 
       HBI's underlying signing bonus obligation as limited by 
       S 502(b)(7). 
 
To determine the extent of the Bankruptcy Court's 
jurisdiction in this case we must examine each of the five 
claims presented to ascertain if it is core, non-core, or 
wholly unrelated to a bankruptcy case. Barry's first claim, 
that HBI's signing bonus obligation is void as part of an 
illegal stock redemption or fraudulent conveyance, is a core 
matter that the Bankruptcy Court was empowered to 
resolve by a final judgment. This claim appears tofit within 
two of S 157(b)'s illustrative examples. Section 157(b)(2)(B) 
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states that core proceeding jurisdiction exists to determine 
the "allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate 
or exemptions from property of the estate . . ." 28 U.S.C. 
S 157(b)(2)(B). The claim seeks a declaration that any claim 
by Irwin against HBI under the Employment Agreement is 
unenforceable. Section 157(b)(2)(H) states that "proceedings 
to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances" are 
core. Id. S 157(b)(2)(H). Barry specifically alleges that HBI's 
granting of Irwin's signing bonus was a fraudulent transfer 
under New Jersey and federal bankruptcy law. More 
importantly, Barry's claim to declare HBI's signing bonus 
obligation unenforceable satisfies this court's core 
proceeding test because it invoked the trustee's power to 
avoid fraudulent conveyances under S 548, a substantive 
provision of the bankruptcy code. Thus, we conclude that 
Barry's first claim "arises in a bankruptcy" and is a core 
claim. 
 
The same cannot be said, however, for Barry's and 
Irwin's "reciprocal claims" concerning the Guaranty's 
enforceability. Irwin's claim is a state law claim for breach 
of a pre-bankruptcy contract to which the debtor was not 
a party. Similarly, Barry's claim for a declaratory judgment 
that he is not personally liable for a breach of that contract 
is predicated upon state law. Neither claim satisfies this 
Court's core proceeding test because neither invokes a 
substantive provision of the bankruptcy code and neither is 
the type of claim that can only be entertained in 
bankruptcy. Rather, these claims involve a dispute between 
two parties, neither of whom is the debtor, over a pre- 
petition contract between them. They must be resolved 
under New Jersey guaranty and contract law and could 
have been brought in state court. While Barry asserts that 
New Jersey would not enforce the Guaranty if HBI's 
underlying obligation is void under federal bankruptcy law, 
this does not render these claim core proceedings. 
 
These claims are nonetheless "non-core" and therefore 
fall within the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction because 
their resolution could "conceivably affect" HBI's estate in 
bankruptcy. For instance, finding the Guaranty to be 
enforceable would provide Irwin, a creditor of HBI under 
the Employment Agreement, with an alternative source of 
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recovery effectively diverting his claims from the bankrupt 
estate. Because these claims are non-core, however, the 
Bankruptcy Court lacked the power to issue final judgment, 
but rather was limited to submitting proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to the District Court. 
 
Barry's alternative claim seeking to limit HBI's liability to 
$75,000 if HBI's signing bonus obligation is not found to be 
an illegal stock redemption or a fraudulent transfer is also 
a core proceeding. This claim appears to fall within 
S 157(b)(2)(B)'s example of "core" matters relating to the 
allowance and estimation of claims against the estate. 28 
U.S.C. S 157(b)(2)(B). Moreover, this claim is brought by 
Barry as HBI's trustee in bankruptcy and invokes 11 U.S.C. 
S 502(b)(7), a substantive provision of the bankruptcy code. 
If the Court on remand finds the signing bonus to be an 
enforceable obligation of HBI, then the Bankruptcy Court 
would have core jurisdiction to entertain Barry's claim to 
limit HBI's liability under S 502(b)(7) and issue final 
judgment thereon. 
 
Barry's related claim, that his personal liability under the 
Guaranty should similarly be limited to $75,000 to be co- 
extensive with HBI's underlying obligation, however, is a 
non-core matter. This claim does not appear to fit within 
any of S 157(b)(2)'s examples and it does not invoke a 
substantive provision of the bankruptcy code; nor is it the 
type of proceeding that can only arise in bankruptcy. 
Rather, this claim, like Barry's claim that the Guaranty is 
entirely unenforceable, depends upon New Jersey's 
guaranty and contract law, not the bankruptcy code, and 
could be resolved in state court. This claim does, however, 
fall within the Bankruptcy Court's non-core jurisdiction 
because it could conceivably affect HBI's bankruptcy estate. 
 
As our discussion illustrates, this case presented the 
Bankruptcy Court with a mixture of core and non-core 
claims. This court has not yet addressed how to determine 
a Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction where it is presented with 
mixed claims. Several courts have employed a claim by 
claim analysis to determine the extent of a Bankruptcy 
Court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re N. Parent, Inc., 221 B.R. 
609, 626 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1998)("[E]ach of Debtor's fourteen 
causes of action will have to be separately analyzed to 
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determine whether it falls within the bankruptcy court's 
core jurisdiction."); In re Best Reception Systems, Inc., 220 
B.R. 932, 946 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1998)("[T]he court must 
examine each cause of action separately to determine if it 
is core or non-core."); In re 610 W. 142 Owners Corp., 219 
B.R. 363, 367 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)(employing claim by 
claim analysis); Ralls v. Docktor Pet Ctr's Inc., 177 B.R. 420, 
425 n.6 (D. Mass. 1995)("A district court must scrutinize 
each count and each asserted right for relief to determine 
which ones were [core and] properly before the bankruptcy 
judge for final resolution and which ones [were non-core 
and] must receive de novo review."). 
 
The Bankruptcy and the District Courts determined that 
the entire proceeding could be characterized as a core 
proceeding under S 157(b)(2)(B) and (O).9 The District Court 
reasoned: 
 
       On November 29, 1993, the Bankruptcy Court entered 
       an Order providing Barry with standing to bring an 
       action to avoid or reduce claims against the debtor's 
       estate under the trustee powers of 11 U.S.C. S 548. The 
       adversary proceeding filed by Barry requested, inter 
       alia, a declaratory judgment that HBI's obligations 
       created by the September 5, 1991 agreements were 
       void as an illegal stock redemption of an insolvent 
       corporation, and constituted a fraudulent conveyance 
       under the Bankruptcy Code and New Jersey state law. 
       Resolution of these proceedings thus required that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. These subsections provide: 
 
       (b)(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to- . . . 
 
        (B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or 
       exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or 
       interests for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 
       12, or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of 
       contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death 
       claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case 
       under title 11; 
 
        (O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of 
the 
       estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity 
security 
       holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death 
       claims. 
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       Bankruptcy Court adjudicate not only a claim against 
       a guarantor of the debtor's obligation, but also an 
       analysis of the extent of the debtor's obligation from 
       which the guarantor's obligation arose. 
 
(Pa. 9-10). We believe the District Court's analysis reflects 
an alternative approach to determining the extent of a 
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction in mixed claims 
proceedings. It resembles the view of those courts which 
hold that "when a proceeding is in part a core proceeding 
and in part non-core, the courts may determine that the 
entire proceeding is core if the core aspect heavily 
predominates and the non-core aspect is insignificant." In 
re Blackman, 55 B.R. 437, 443 (Bankr. D.C. 1985); see In 
re Hughes-Bechtol Inc., 141 B.R. 946, 949 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1992); In re Cinematronics Inc., 111 B.R. 892, 901 
(Bankr. S.D.Cal. 1990); In re Sibarium, 107 B.R. 108, 115 
(N.D. Tex. 1989); In re GWF Investment, Ltd., 85 B.R. 771, 
778 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1988). Other courts have expressly 
rejected or declined to follow the "predominantly core" 
approach. See, e.g., In re Best, 220 B.R. at 950; 610 W. 142 
Owners Corp., 219 B.R. at 370; Glinka, 1994 WL 905714, 
at *10 & n.14. 
 
We adopt the claim-by-claim approach as the only one 
consistent with the teachings of Marathon. This case well 
illustrates the point. In Marathon, as we have noted, a 
debtor in bankruptcy sued for breach of a pre-petition 
contract. The Court held that it would violate Article III for 
an Article I Bankruptcy Judge to adjudicate finally the 
tendered state law claim even though the plaintiff was a 
debtor in bankruptcy. Here, if we followed the approach of 
the Bankruptcy and District Courts, we would be required 
to sanction the entry of judgment by an Article I Judge on 
a pre-petition state law contract claim where neither party 
is in bankruptcy. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the only core matters before 
the Bankruptcy Court were Barry's claims (i) that HBI's 
signing bonus obligation was unenforceable as an illegal 
stock redemption or fraudulent conveyance, and (ii) that, if 
HBI's signing bonus obligation was enforceable, HBI's 
obligation should be limited to $75,000 under S 502(b)(7). 
We agree with the District Court's conclusion that the 
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Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to enter a final order or 
judgment on these claims. However, the remaining claims 
regarding the Guaranty's enforceability and the extent of 
Barry's liability thereunder are non-core proceedings. The 
Bankruptcy Court did not have the power to issuefinal 
judgment on these claims, but rather was limited to 
submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to the District Court under S 157(c). Thus, the District 
Court erred in affirming the Bankruptcy Court's exercise of 
core proceeding jurisdiction to declare the Guaranty 
unenforceable as a violation of public policy. 
 
III. ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF CONTRACT 
       PRINCIPLES 
 
Having affirmed the District Court's determination that 
the Bankruptcy Court had core proceeding jurisdiction to 
enter a final judgment on Barry's claim that HBI's signing 
bonus obligation was unenforceable as part of an illegal 
stock redemption or a fraudulent conveyance, we now 
consider the District Court's decision on the merits of that 
claim. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court and District Courts employed 
substantially similar modes of analysis. The initial task was 
to determine the parties' intent utilizing traditional 
principles of contract law. After finding the text of the 
September Transaction documents ambiguous, the 
Bankruptcy Court considered the extrinsic evidence 
tendered at trial and made a factual finding that the 
parties' minds met on a redemption of Irwin's stock by HBI, 
and that the Purchase Letter effectuated this intended 
redemption.10 Next, it considered whether the redemption 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We read the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that a stock redemption 
was intended on September 5, 1991, and effectuated on April 15, 1992, 
to rest exclusively on its factual finding that this was what the parties 
intended. This is thus not a case where a court acknowledges that the 
parties intended one form of transaction, but treats the transaction in a 
different manner for reasons unrelated to the parties' intent. Compare 
Sedbrook v. Zimmerman Group, Ltd., 526 N.W.2d 758 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1994)("de facto" merger); Fenderson v. Athey Prod's Corp. Kolman Div., 
581 N.E.2d 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)(same). 
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thus accomplished was consistent with New Jersey law. 
Based on its finding that HBI was insolvent at the time of 
the redemption, it held that the transaction violated 
N.J.S.A. 14A:7-14.1. The Bankruptcy Court then turned to 
consider whether the September Transaction constituted a 
fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. S 548 and N.J.S.A. 
25.2-20, et seq. It was undisputed that the Agreement for 
redemption of Irwin's stock was entered within a year of the 
Bankruptcy Court's order of relief and at a time when the 
HBI was insolvent. The Bankruptcy Court focused upon the 
only remaining fraudulent transfer element: whether HBI 
"received less than reasonably equivalent value when it 
entered into the redemption agreement." Slip. 36. Because 
it was undisputed that the stock had a value of $1.00 or 
less, the Court concluded that HBI's obligation to pay Irwin 
$300,000 was a fraudulent conveyance. Finally, the 
Bankruptcy Court held that Barry's personal guaranty was 
unenforceable because it was a part of an integrated 
transaction involving an illegal stock redemption. 
 
Tracing the steps of the Bankruptcy Court's analysis 
demonstrates that the foundation of its ultimate legal 
conclusions was its finding that the parties contracted for 
a stock redemption. We must respectfully disagree with this 
foundational premise. We find no ambiguity in the text of 
the documents and all of the extrinsic evidence relevant 
under New Jersey law is entirely consistent with the 
express and unambiguous intent reflected in those terms. 
While the parties intended that Irwin would grant an option 
to HBI that could result in a redemption, they did not 
intend for that option to be exercised at a time when HBI 
was insolvent. Moreover, all of the relevant evidence 
indicates that no redemption occurred. 
 
We begin with basic principles of New Jersey contract 
law: 
 
       Evidence of the circumstances is always admissible in 
       aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement. 
       This is so even when the contract on its face is free 
       from ambiguity. The polestar of construction is the 
       intention of the parties to the contract as revealed by 
       the language used, taken as an entirety; and, in the 
       quest for the intention, the situation of the parties, the 
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       attendant circumstances, and the objects they were 
       thereby striving to attain are necessarily to be 
       regarded. The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts 
       is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to 
       secure light by which to measure its actual 
       significance. Such evidence is adducible only for the 
       purpose of interpreting the writing -- not for the 
       purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its 
       terms, but to aid in determining the meaning of what 
       has been said. So far as the evidence tends to show, 
       not the meaning of the writing, but an intention wholly 
       unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant. The judicial 
       interpretive function is to consider what was written in 
       the context of the circumstances under which it was 
       written, and accord to the language a rational meaning 
       in keeping with the expressed general purpose. 
 
Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 
301 (N.J. 1953). 
 
We next turn to the documents. The four simultaneously 
executed documents spell out carefully, and in great detail, 
the terms of an integrated transaction, the primary 
objectives of which were (1) to vest Barry with immediate 
control of HBI, (2) to provide Barry with the opportunity of 
becoming the sole stockholder of HBI and (3) to terminate 
any relationship between HBI and Irwin other than his 
employment relationship. To accomplish these objectives, 
the documents unambiguously provide, inter alia, for (a) the 
immediate transfer of Irwin's stock to Barry as voting 
trustee, (b) the granting of an irrevocable three year option 
to purchase Irwin's HBI stock exercisable by Barry, HBI, or 
an entity to be organized by Barry, (c) the employment of 
Irwin by HBI in a sales capacity, (d) the payment by HBI of 
a $300,000 signing bonus to Irwin, (e) Irwin's agreement to 
a restrictive covenant of non-disclosure and non- 
competition, (f) Irwin's resignation as an officer and director 
of HBI, and his release of all his rights under HBI's 
stockholder agreement and executive compensation plan, 
(g) the exchange of releases between Irwin on the one hand 
and Barry and HBI on the other, and (h) Barry's guaranty 
of HBI's signing bonus obligation. The Letter Agreement 
provided that Irwin's rights under the Employment 
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Agreement (including the signing bonus) were being given 
to him in consideration for his agreement to enter the 
overall transaction (e.g., his commitments to transfer his 
stock to the voting trust, to grant the irrevocable option, to 
provide services, to release his rights, etc.). 
 
Barry signed the Letter Agreement, both individually and 
as HBI's president. (Pa. 533) On January 15, 1992, Barry 
exercised the stock buyout option by sending a letter signed 
in his individual capacity, to himself, as voting trustee, and 
to Irwin stating: "[Y]ou are hereby notified that I elect to 
exercise my option to acquire all of the shares of stock in 
Halper Bros., Inc., which are held by the Voting Trustee 
pursuant to the Voting Trust Agreement." (Pa. 
526)(emphasis added). 
 
Discussing the preamble of the Letter Agreement, the 
Bankruptcy Court noted: 
 
       The plain language of [statement (i)] fails to delineate 
       whether the transaction is a sale of stock by an 
       individual shareholder or a redemption of the Debtor's 
       stock by the Company. The text also fails to stipulate 
       who is the purchaser of the stock, the Debtor, or Barry 
       or an entity controlled by Barry. The signature portion 
       of the Letter Agreement also offers no assistance to the 
       Court as it was executed by Barry, individually, and 
       Barry in his capacity as president of the Debtor. 
 
(Pa. 51) 
 
While the above statements are true, these facts do not 
make the Letter Agreement ambiguous or inconsistent. 
Rather, the precise language of the Letter Agreement 
creates the unambiguous possibility of either a sale or a 
redemption of the stock to any one of the three potential 
purchasers. Because Barry assumed sole control of HBI 
immediately upon the agreements' execution, this meant 
that Barry had a choice: he could purchase the stock 
individually, acquire the stock through an entity controlled 
by him, or cause HBI to redeem the shares. Any of the 
three methods would accomplish the undisputed primary 
objective of making Barry HBI's sole shareholder. The fact 
that a choice of method existed does not create an 
ambiguity by itself. If Barry or an entity controlled by Barry 
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exercised the option to purchase Irwin's shares, the 
transaction would constitute a personal purchase and sale 
of stock between shareholders. However, if, and only if, HBI 
exercised this option, the transaction would constitute a 
redemption. Because Barry signed the Purchase Letter in 
his individual capacity and stated that he elected to 
exercise his option, this transaction constituted a personal 
purchase of the stock, not a redemption by HBI. 
 
Moreover, an examination of all of the extrinsic evidence 
confirms, rather than conflicts with, the intent evidenced in 
the documents. The cousins had previously declined to 
enter a transaction in which the benefit to them came 
solely through a redemption of their stock because they 
were aware that such an agreement would be 
unenforceable during any period of insolvency. This 
rejection as well as Barry's desire to secure a tax deduction 
for HBI resulted in a compromise. To appease the selling 
cousins, their stock could be purchased by Barry or a new 
Barry-created entity. These potential purchasers--unlike 
HBI--could exercise their options while HBI was insolvent. 
To accommodate Barry's tax concern, payment for this 
option would come through HBI as a deductible signing 
bonus. Finally, the selling cousins' concerns regarding 
HBI's ability to pay the signing bonus were allayed by 
Barry's personal guaranty thereof. 
 
In short, based on the September Transaction 
documents, the extrinsic evidence, and the unambiguous 
terms of the Purchase Letter, we conclude that (1) Irwin 
granted an option to HBI that could be exercised if Barry 
infused capital and turned the business around, but which 
all recognized could not be exercised during insolvency, (2) 
Irwin granted Barry an option to purchase his shares which 
Barry exercised, and (3) there was no stock redemption. 
 
In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the 
fact that the Bankruptcy Court credited the testimony of 
Barry and his lawyer that they intended the Purchase 
Letter to be an exercise of HBI's option to buy Irwin's stock. 
We accept that factual finding for present purposes. Under 
New Jersey law, however, Barry's subjective intent is not 
legally relevant. The undisclosed subjective intent of a 
participant in a transaction cannot be used to alter the 
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intent clearly manifested in the documents to which he 
subscribed. See Atlantic Northern, 12 N.J. at 301. The 
Bankruptcy Court's reliance on that evidence was therefore 
error. 
 
As we have earlier noted, the Bankruptcy Court's 
erroneous determination that the transaction constituted a 
stock redemption was the basis for its judgment that the 
stock transfer was illegal and that the Guaranty was 
unenforceable. It follows that we must reverse the District 
Court's judgment and remand with instructions that there 
be further proceedings. 
 
IV. THE REMAND 
 
Our conclusion does not, of course, resolve this 
controversy. A number of issues remain to be resolved on 
remand. The first of these is Barry's claim that the signing 
bonus was a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. S 548. 
We have held only that the $300,000 signing bonus was 
not a fraudulent transfer as consideration paid by HBI to 
Irwin for stock found by the Bankruptcy Court to be worth 
$1.00 per share or less in a stock redemption. The 
Bankruptcy Court's focus was upon the value of Irwin's 
stock. On remand, it must focus on the value of the 
consideration to be given by Irwin under the terms of the 
September Transaction as we have interpreted them and on 
the extent to which HBI, rather than Barry, was to receive 
that consideration. As we have heretofore also held, this 
fraudulent transfer claim is a core proceeding because 
Barry as trustee invokes 11 U.S.C. S 548. Thus, it may be 
entertained by the District Court or it may be referred to 
the Bankruptcy Court for adjudication under 28 U.S.C. 
S 157(a). 
 
Second, the Guaranty's enforceability must be considered 
on remand to resolve Barry's claim for a declaratory 
judgment of unenforceability and Irwin's reciprocal claim 
for a coercive judgment enforcing the Guaranty. Further 
consideration is required for two reasons. First, we have 
determined that the Bankruptcy Court was without 
jurisdiction to enter judgment and further proceedings are 
required before the District Court to resolve this "non-core" 
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matter. Second, it may be necessary on remand to 
reevaluate the circumstances in which the transaction was 
entered in the light of our reading of the relevant 
documents. As we have indicated, the Bankruptcy Court 
viewed the September Transaction as intended to syphon 
off $300,000 in corporate funds in return for virtually 
worthless stock while HBI was insolvent. It would seem 
permissible to us, however, for a fact finder to determine on 
this record that the September Transaction was not entered 
for the purpose of defrauding creditors. The transaction 
gave Barry a variety of options, each of which, depending 
on the circumstances that unfolded, could be executed in a 
manner consistent with public policy. The parties knew 
that if Barry chose to infuse capital these arrangements 
would be wholly consistent with the rights of HBI's 
creditors. They may also have intended that if Barry 
decided not to make the necessary capital infusion, the 
signing bonus would not be paid by HBI, but rather the 
consideration for Irwin's various commitments would come 
personally from Barry's pocket under the Guaranty without 
prejudice to creditors. 
 
We do not here decide that the intention of the parties in 
September of 1991 is relevant to the enforceability of the 
Guaranty under New Jersey law. We leave it to the District 
Court (with the assistance of the Bankruptcy Court if it so 
chooses) to determine the applicable New Jersey law 
including the significance, if any, of the parties' intent at 
the time the Guaranty was made. We note, however, that 
there is some New Jersey case law supporting the 
proposition that unconditional guarantees that extend a 
guarantor's responsibility beyond that of the primary 
obligor are enforceable. The Superior Court in National 
Westminster Bank NJ v. Lomker, 649 A.2d 1328 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), for example, held that a 
guarantor's liability may exceed that of the principal under 
New Jersey law. See id. at 1332 ("The liability of a 
guarantor is measured by that of the principal, unless the 
agreement explicitly provides otherwise."). In dicta, the 
court even entertained the possibility that a guarantor 
could explicitly waive the defenses of bad faith, fraud or 
conspiracy. See id.; see also Nation Wide, Inc. v. Scullin, 
256 F. Supp. 929, 932 (D.N.J. 1966)("However harsh a 
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bargain it may seem in retrospect, the defendants' 
obligation was voluntarily assumed and made absolute by 
its terms."); Midatlantic Bank, N.A. v. Strong, 1996 WL 
697940, *5 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)("[E]ven absolute, unconditional 
guarantees are upheld and enforced by New Jersey 
courts."); Lenape State Bank v. Winslow Corp., 523 A.2d 
223, 231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)(upholding 
unconditional guaranty under New Jersey law); cf. 
Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 696 A.2d 744, 748 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)(finding guaranty unconditional 
even in absence of term "unconditional"). Here, Barry's 
Guaranty explicitly provided that Barry waived: 
 
       any and all defenses of HBI and [Barry], including, 
       without limitation, any and all defenses now or 
       hereafter arising or asserted by reason of (a) any lack 
       of power, capacity or authority of HBI with respect to 
       the Employment Agreement, the Letter Agreement or 
       the Obligations or any part thereof; (b) the 
       unenforceability of the Employment Agreement, the 
       Letter Agreement or the Obligations against HBI 
 
       *  *  *  *  * 
 
       Notwithstanding anything else contained in this 
       [Guaranty] Agreement, [Irwin]'s rights and [Barry]'s 
       obligations under this Agreement shall be reinstated 
       and revived, and the enforceability of this Agreement 
       shall continue, with respect to any amount at any time 
       prior to or after the date of this Agreement paid on 
       account of the Obligations which thereafter shall be 
       required to be restored or returned by [Irwin] under 
       any bankruptcy, fraudulent conveyance, insolvency or 
       reorganization laws or for any other reason all as 
       though such amount had not been paid. 
 
(Pa. 535-36). The court on remand should consider whether 
this express language is enforceable under New Jersey law 
under the circumstances of this case.11  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Bankruptcy Court, in the course of holding that the Guaranty 
was unenforceable against public policy, concluded that the Guaranty 
was not "severable" from the September Transaction's other documents. 
Irwin did not challenge this conclusion on his appeal to the District 
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Finally, if the court determines that HBI's signing bonus 
obligation was not a fraudulent conveyance, the court must 
then consider Barry's alternative claim that 11 U.S.C. 
S 502(b)(7) limits HBI and Barry's liability under the 
Guaranty to $75,000. The claim that HBI's obligation is 
limited to this amount is a core proceeding because it 
invokes a substantive provision of the bankruptcy code and 
may be decided in the first instance by the District Court or 
the Bankruptcy Court. Barry's derivative claim that his 
Guaranty liability should be similarly limited, however, is a 
non-core claim upon which only the District Court can 
issue final judgment. Nonetheless, the District Court may 
refer the claim to the Bankruptcy Court for proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed and 
this matter will be remanded to it for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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Court and Barry insists that he thereby waived any claim that the 
Guaranty was enforceable even if HBI's commitment to pay the signing 
bonus was unenforceable. We are unpersuaded. Irwin consistently 
maintained before the District Court, and before us, that the Guaranty, 
including the above-quoted portions, should be enforced in accordance 
with its literal terms. 
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